The EU's Nobel

The European Union won the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize a few days ago, and the mockery and anger that followed were as vehement as they were predictable. For what it's worth, I'm not a big fan of giving such awards to institutions rather than individuals. But does the EU deserve such an honor as much as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007), the International Atomic Energy Agency (2005), or the United Nations (2001)? Sure.

Yes, the United States and NATO and the Cold War framework helped prevent war in Europe. But they did not guarantee the productive cooperation between former enemies and rivals which has changed the continent and made war in Western Europe unthinkable. The founding fathers of the European Community were far-sighted men, and their project of European integration helped create an enormously prosperous continent for hundreds of millions of people. Earlier hold-outs like the Sweden, Finland and Austria joined in the 1990s precisely because the European Union was a roaring success, and Europe and the EU were starting to mean the same thing in the eyes of many. For Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and then for the 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe that joined in 2004 and 2007, and for those in the Western Balkans and further east who continue to look to the EU, it means something even more important - an anchoring in a community of democratic values for people who had lived under dictatorships in the decades after World War II, and feared its return.

So why the moaning? Yes, European governments and the bureaucrats who make the EU run don't seem as heroic as activists facing authoritarian governments or fighting for development and rights for the world's poorest. And yes, there are hordes of British and American commentators who have always hated the EU, and those keen to further debase the prize to further embarrass the controversial 2009 winner, President of-then-less-than-a-year Barack Obama. But much of the complaints are because of the timing. The committee of Norweigans have given the EU the prize when it looks like it might be in its dying throes. Or else in the birth pangs of a more integrated polity which would be constructed against the will of a Euroskeptic movement that has never been larger or noisier. The EU has utterly failed to handle its crisis of confidence, with Angela Merkel's Germany imposing austerity on the troubled states at a level that is self-defeating in terms of calming the crisis. Elections cannot fundamentally change policy in countries like Greece. Even if a "Grexit" looks less likely in the short term than it recently did, a Spanish bailout looks in the cards. Merkel and her finance minister Wolfgang Schaeuble poo-poo any talk of a fundamental change in their policy. European Central Bank President Mario Draghi helps, but makes clear he can't save the euro by himself. Europe lives in a state of permanent economic crisis. The European Union's future is, bluntly, bleak. And the Nobel Committee is obviously hoping to spur greater Brussels and European capitals to save their union, whatever it takes.

The late Wangari Maathai was a Kenyan environmental and political activist. She was the first African woman to win the Nobel Peace Prize, in 2004. I see her as among the more interesting and more deserving of the recent award winners, and there is no doubt at all in my mind that she was morally superior to the likes of Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder and Tony Blair. But on some level I wish the EU had received this award in October 2004.

In 2004, membership of the European Union increased from 15 to 25, as the countries of Central Europe "returned to Europe." That was an accomplishment worth awarding in and of itself, on top of all that the EU had done over the decades to cement Franco-German friendship and southern European democracy and to spread prosperity across the continent. The EU was also wrapped up in its constitutional debate - before it had become a constitutional crisis which was only put on ice in 2009, only to be reopened months later by the Greek debt crisis. Would such an elite recognition of an elite project have helped the "Yes" vote in France and the Netherlands in 2005? Maybe not, but one could hope. Would a European Union that had moved forward with deepening as well as widening as its shapers had always intended, currency union before true political union but ultimately requiring that as it was, have been able to avert the crisis before the wave of Euroskepticism left it half-finished? Maybe not, but one could hope.

In 2012, though, the euro looks like a half-baked idea and the European Union's consensus-based decision-making combined with angry publics and scared governments have turned the common currency into an infernal machine to undo the political gains of European integration. Thomas Risse, in his book A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, notes that bad news about the European Union in public spheres is bad for the construction of European identity. That doesn't bode well for today's EU of headlines about bailouts and anarchy in Athens. If there's a counter-balancing "we're all in the same boat" feeling, as I believe there is, it still weaker than the feeling many appear to have that this whole European integration thing might have been a dreadful mistake.

Barack Obama actually did a great job with his Nobel acceptance speech. Selected for peace, but elected by the American people as commander in chief, he laid out an eloquent case for just war. That the troop surge in Afghanistan might have been a mistake (though not unjust) does not invalidate the correctness of Obama's argument. The European Union also needs to take this opportunity and use it to build momentum towards a solution of the crisis. The sight of Herman Van Rompuy, Jose Manuel Barroso, and Martin Schulz, of the European Council, Commission, and Parliament, squabbling over who gets to accept the award will not make the EU look good. Everyone can go to Oslo, but there should be one speaker and one damn good speech. Out of those three, Van Rompuy, as representative of the member states, who are indeed the actors which actually created the European Union, has the best case for primacy. He is the President of Europe that everyone was talking about before the quiet Belgian was actually selected. But you might find a better speaker, or a louder voice. Would Angela Merkel be appropriate? She would be if she laid out a serious, doable path forward that actually stabilizes the European Union, which she would then take to the German people in her re-election campaign over the following year. If not, maybe Schulz. He's German, and he represents both the most democratic of the European institutions, the Parliament, as well as the Social Democrats, the political party that could change Merkel's counterproductive policies if she won't change them herself.

Kosovo: What's Next

The International Court of Justice issued a clear decision in the case of the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence yesterday: the declaration is legal, because declarations of independence are not illegal under international law. This ruling could have ramifications in many other places around the globe where there are separatist movements, but the court did not certify that Kosovo is a state that should be independent and a member of the United Nations. It left that to the nations of the world to decide by recognition. 69 countries have recognized Kosovo so far, the amount has grown slowly since the initial weeks after independence, although Kosovo has picked up some key regional backers, such as Montenegro. Many analysts are predicting that many more countries will recognize Kosovo soon after this decision. No one has been the first to jump yet, and I'm not sure how many will recognize in the near future.

The Economist just published a useful map of recognizing and not-recognizing states. The main reasons for not recognizing Kosovo are because your country has a separatist problem and because not recognizing Kosovo will keep you friends with Serbia and its most powerful supporters in this issue, Russia and China. The main reasons to recognize Kosovo is that will put you on the good side of the United States and the main European powers and because it is the just and right thing to do. Kosovo is independent and guarded by the international community today because Yugoslavia's leaders applied a heavy-handed ethnic cleansing approach to a separatism issue in the 1990s, not because Albania's borders were drawn so the state excluded more than half of all Albanians in the 1910s.

While the ICJ decision is definitely good for Kosovo and bad for Serbia's case of getting Kosovo back, I don't see that many countries moving right away. Four out of the five EU countries which do not recognize Kosovo have already reiterated their positions, including Spain, the one that is not acting as a friend of Serbia or Russia but entirely because of its domestic issues, Slovakia, which has a new center-right and Atlanticist government, and Romania. Greece appears to still be thinking. It is the one of the five without a separatist problem of its own, but it has a stake in Cyprus's situation and is close to both Serbia and Russia. Greece could be a powerful first mover, and it could use goodwill from the rest of Europe in its current financial state, although that might lower the possibilities of getting financial help from the Russians. This would be a politically easier West-pleasing recognition for Greece to make than recognizing Macedonia by its actual name. Still, I don't expect Greece to move now. I hope they give me a mild and pleasant surprise.

Looking at the map, if I have to guess the 70th country to recognize I might say Chile. New president Sebastian Pinera, the most conservative leader of a non-recognizing Latin American country, would ingratiate himself with Washington by the move. But that's a pretty wild guess, there are many possibilities. Once one makes the move, a few more might soon after. But Kosovo probably won't reach the 100 recognizers needed for UN membership without Serbia gaining entry to the EU with acceptance of Kosovo's independence as the cost of accession. Whether a country is willing to demand that, what Serbia would do when the choice of EU or Kosovo was laid out that starkly, and whether the EU will ever actually expand beyond Croatia are the key questions.

Kosovo's future will not be decided by an assortment of African, Asian and Latin American countries recognizing its independence, nor in Washington, Moscow and Beijing, but in the Balkans and in Brussels, the Hague and New York.

World Cup, Day 3

When Clint Dempsey's shot slipped through Robert Green's hands yesterday, the American ran down the field pointing his fingers and his eyes to the heavens. With good reason - America's draw against England can't really be attributed to an impressive performance by its strikers or midfielders, and the less said about the defenders the better. Chalk it up to a combination of divine intervention or luck, whatever you prefer, and Tim Howard's top-notch goal-keeping. The draw was a fine result for Team USA. England, who I believed was one of four or five teams that could win the Cup (Spain, Brazil, the Netherlands, England, maybe Argentina), did not look bad but nor did they look like champions.

Germany, on the other hand, just made a statement. Given that their goalkeeper had committed suicide last year and that their next-choice goalie and captain Michael Ballack were out of this Cup, I predicted Germany, along with fellow European powers Italy and France, was headed towards a disappointing Cup, even a first-round knockout in Group D, which looked decently tough before today. But after today's results Germany and Ghana have momentum, Germany looks like a contender, Ghana looks like it might be Africa's great hope, Serbia looks haunted by the prospect of second consecutive bad Cup performance, and you can stick a fork in Australia's ass and turn them over, they're done, with their best player red-carded out of the last two group games.

Little Slovenia is next up for the Americans. When I was shopping for jerseys I considered them, as their mountain outline is either one of the coolest jerseys in the tournament or a bit too Charlie Brown. But Slovenia gear was off-limits because they're in my team's group. I see a US victory and the US and England both in the Round of 16, with England more likely to finish first on goal differential or America drawing one of its two remaining opponents. Then Germany would be a scary opponent, but we'll see how they play in their next two games. Ghana is capable of beating them, and from the qualifiers, you would think Serbia able as well.

And then there's Greece, who I had picked as my second-favorite team in the Cup, based on my Greek roots and the present situation of the country (this job is flexible, last year it was held by home team Germany). I picked them for the semifinals on a whim, but now I don't think they're going to make it out of the group. They were easily outclassed by South Korea yesterday. Which means they're playing for respect, and against history. I've found many interesting nuggets of information in the Goldman Sachs World Cup 2010 and Economics report. One of which is that only one team has played a full six games in the World Cup without winning at least a draw. But Slovenia, Greece, and New Zealand could all have joined El Salvador in this ignominious record by the end of this World Cup. With its victory, Slovenia has more than a snowball's chance in hell of actually advancing to the second round ahead of the United States or England. But Greece and New Zealand could yet match the record. Greece, additionally, has lost four games, and never scored a goal, with 12 goals against it. Only Zaire, which was outscored 14-0 in its one Cup, has a more lopsided history. El Salvador's goal differential is 1-22. To escape ignominy, Greece must beat or draw mighty Argentina or Africa's largest county, Nigeria, which has a very good keeper. So good luck Greece, you'll need it.

Touring Europe Without Leaving Washington

In April, skies blackened above Europe as Iceland's Eyjafjallajokull volcano spewed ash over an area of thousands of miles and as far away as Russia, causing the cancellation of nearly all flights to, from, and around the continent and, in short, utter chaos. Then the markets' confidence in Greece's ability to survive a sovereign debt crisis went from bad to nonexistent. European leaders eventually faced up to the existential nature of the crisis in the eurozone but contagion had already started to spread. Protests in Athens against austerity measures turned into deadly riots featuring Molotov cocktails. Then British voters delivered twin scary results for the country's economic stability and its place in Europe - a hung parliament and a Tory plurality. And the volcano has decided it isn't finished yet.

The state of Europe’s union is not strong. It is being sorely tested. Hopefully it will come through a tough couple years and be stronger than ever. On Saturday in Washington, DC, the EU was putting its best face forward, welcoming hordes of fascinated Americans and other citizens of the world into their 27 embassies plus the delegation of the EU itself for its annual Open House Day. As a theme, the embassies were encouraged to promote the EU’s relatively impressive record on alternative energy, which some took more seriously than others.

I made a day of it, and managed to exceed my own expectations, visiting seven embassies from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. This was a cool opportunity - DC has upwards of 180 embassies, many with multiple buildings, packed into it, but I had only ever been inside one - that of the Russian Federation for a tribute Andrei Gromyko featuring Henry Kissinger. I began by walking down Florida Avenue towards Dupont Circle, my usual path to school, but kept going on Florida until I reached the cluster of embassies west of Dupont and east of Rock Creek. This is home to a third of the EU buildings as well as the delegations of a couple more countries which would like to be in the EU (Turkey, Albania, Moldova, which shares its building with one of my favorite restaurants and classy bars, Russia House). My friend Phil had worked in the US embassy in Estonia last summer and we met outside that cozy corner embassy at the intersection of Florida and Massachusetts and 22nd Street, across the street from Luxembourg’s ridiculously oversized palace, along with his girlfriend Ulla from Austria. The Estonians still had their front door locked and seemed surprised to see us at 10:15. They also lacked a stamp for the “passport” on the Open House Day brochure, as it was apparently in New York. A filmstrip showed pictures of Estonia’s nature and wildlife. This is a lovely, charming and beautiful little country (the EU’s fourth-smallest by population), I was there in January in Tallinn for two days and nearly dropped out of graduate school to take a job at the hostel. Estonians are quiet but friendly. Designer clothes by Reet Aus made from recycled materials, including a blouse decorated with little moose, hung in the corner. Photographs displayed the late President of Estonia Lennart Meri with Boris Yeltsin, Vice President Al Gore, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, and legendary diplomat George Kennan, who worked at the American embassy in Tallinn in the 1930s. We picked up booklets like Minifacts About Estonia 2009. Did you know the national stone of Estonia is limestone?

Next up was Greece. I had a vague idea of touring the PIIGS, the peripheral economies that the market is so worried about, plus Britain, which also had a terrible public finances problem and just had a fascinating election. I spent Thursday night in front of my computer, watching the 650 constituencies of the United Kingdom turn 11 different colors, until the Green Party won Brighton Pavilion and I decided I needed to go to sleep at about 1:30 a.m. Plus the Embassy of the United Kingdom had a fascinating description of its activities in the brochure: “Britain on Your Doorstep: The Embassy will showcase the Ambassador’s Gardens and a Bazaar highlighting the armed forces, arts, whisky, eco-friendly displays and family activities.” Much more interesting sounding than “Come visit the Embassy of Luxembourg for the day!” Plus we kept seeing people with complimentary fancy plastic displaying the Union Jack. But I sadly did not make it to the UK embassy. It does serve as consolation that both the ambassador and his deputy visited my Modern British Politics class at SAIS this semester.

Greece’s line was long, absurdly so once we left though still shorter than Ireland’s across the street, but bad enough at 10:45. The line kept going once we were inside the embassy’s basement, because the Greeks had not yet become so austere that they could not offer us delicious samples of olives, olive oil, tzatziki sauce, and cookies, along with pamphlets, maps, and raffle tickets for an Aegean cruise. Ulla got frustrated and went outside because she dislikes olives and perhaps Greece. I enjoyed the snacks and a few minutes of traditional Greek dance before moving on outside. I am partly of Greek extraction myself (it may well account for my family’s wiliness) and visited in 2003. I would like to return someday. My sister Anna went last year and made it to our ancestral island of Nissiros, right off the coast of Turkey south of Kos. By her account, it’s the only Greek island where the women have big thighs instead of long beautiful legs. It comes from climbing up and down the volcano, which started going off around the turn of the century, driving most of the population into the arms of America.

I left Phil and Ulla at Starbucks and joined other friends, Cory and Ben, in the line at the Portuguese embassy. This line wasn’t so long but it was slow. Then again, Portugal’s embassy isn’t so huge as Greece’s. It is quite nice, and the Portuguese were formal about it. We entered in groups for a three step tour. An overstressed mother yelled at us for cutting in line, which we didn’t, and told us not to do it again. The military attaché, an officer of the Portuguese Air Force, brought us into a small room where we were shown a video about Portugal’s substantial use of alternative energies. We walked by a painting of the country’s original ambassador to the US, who was such good friends with Thomas Jefferson that he lived at Monticello for a few months. The current ambassador, João de Vallera, greeted us all personally in his office, where he talked about the historically excellent relations and economic linkages between our two countries. On his desk was a copy of the Financial Times and Cory spotted additional material about understanding the EU economy. Portugal is being targeted by the speculators, a bit unfairly, as the weakest link in the eurozone after Greece. The country simply does not grow that fast, with low productivity growth exceeded by higher wage growth, although its public finances are not terrible. I hope Portugal doesn’t get screwed by the crisis. I spent a lovely week in Lisbon in spring 2006 and have a love for the country, that city, and its food. We got to sample mini pastéis de nata, wonderful custard pastries that are great with coffee, and a drop of port wine, which is one EU export which I purchase multiple times a year.

The day was hot but windy, and my eyes were being continuously attacked by specks of dirt and plant matter. The lines for the shuttle buses between the embassies were very long, which is why we decided to skip the UK and take the Metro to Van Ness and visit the Slovak embassy. Central Europe – Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – are based much further to the north than the rest of the EU, in another cluster of chanceries which also includes Israel, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Nigeria, and the United Arab Emirates. It appeared that there was a long line for Austria and no line at all for Slovakia (it turned out that the line was for the shuttle bus). But Slovakia was nice, children in national dress handed us helpings of dumplings and sauerkraut, a traditional band played, arts were on display, and the backyard had a Friends of Slovakia Wall of Honor. I had my picture taken with it, as a friend of Slovakians (and housemate of one of them). Slovakia’s best friend, however, is US Steel, which was honored on about half of 50 or so plaques. We went back for more dumplings. Slovakia had limited tourist information – mostly about its skiing – and not much about alternative energies. Robert Fico’s government has decided not to close old nuclear plants near the Austrian border that Slovakia was supposed to shutter when they gained entry to the European Union. Austria was not pleased.

With plates of dumplings and sauerkraut in hand, we moved on to Austria, where we surprised by the lack of the line. Given what the people downtown were experiencing, we had clearly made an enlightened decision in coming to spend our time with Central Europe. However, there might have been one good reason Austria had no line – they were already out of strudel. But I didn’t mind, because there was still free wine, free coffee, free information on master’s programs in History of South-Eastern Europe and free tourist publications about hiking in Tirol, which has many gorgeous mountain landscapes and women.

The bus line was still endless, so we followed a bevy of chattering Fräuleins back towards Connecticut Avenue, where Cory left us to go read at his restaurant before his shift. Ben and I continued on foot down the hill to the edge of Rock Creek Park, where the Hungarians and Czechs have embassies on Spring of Freedom Lane. Outside the Hungarian embassy lounged a number of fine specimens of the Kuvasz, a beautiful white Hungarian dog, and the Vizsla, a less beautiful in my opinion but apparently also nice Hungarian breed. Inside we saw displays of lace and china, and a couple performed a Hungarian dance in traditional dress. The couple then offered to teach the dance; I was more interested in the goulash and wine but at this embassy you had to pay for the food. Perhaps wisely, given that Hungary has been the subject of an IMF rescue since 2008.

We walked back up the hill to the Czech campus. Young women in traditional dress greeted us at the entry, we moved through the building without spending much time with the modern Czech designs on display to get the free beer – a generous full glass of Pilsner Urquell rather than an ounce of booze like most samples today. We sat on the sunny hill with many others, drinking our afternoon beers, and watched a cluster of red, white and blue balloons escape into the sky. We just missed getting to go up the path to tour the ambassador’s residence as a woman put a chain across the gate as the clock struck 4.

Enough European embassies for the day, I suppose. I took the Metro home with several pounds worth of tourist pamphlets and informational booklets wrapped inside my jackets and passed out on the couch. If I’m still in Washington next May, I will definitely embark on another day of touring the embassies of the European Union. As long as the European Union is still here then… (don’t panic, it will be).

The Rape of Europa; or Greece and Germany, You Disappoint Me

Last night in my Balkans class I brought up Greece, which has by now rejoined Europe’s messiest region (not including the Caucasus). Asked by the professor what I thought about the debt crisis, I said that given what we had seen in the last three days (the sharp rise in debt yields for Greece, Portugal and Spain and debt downgrades for those countries), the euro was finished. That’s a bit hyperbolic, as I tend to be, especially when I talk rather than write. But the problem is huge and I do believe the European Union as we know it is on the brink and we are likelier than not to see some major changes.

There is plenty of blame to go around. True fiscal federalism and a United States of Europe are not what the citizens of the European Union want, so there are political limits to the centralization of fiscal decision-making, which would the best way to ensure a stable common European currency. I do not support the argument of those who wrote ten years ago that the euro was doomed and who are now eagerly writing columns to prove that they were right. The euro was a much greater success than anyone anticipated for a full decade. There were two large policy problems beyond the inevitable and insurmountable economic asymmetries which have led to the problems of Spain, for example, which experienced a construction boom and built up external private sector debts and cannot devalue its currency in the crisis because it is on the euro. The first was that the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact limiting debt to 60% of GDP and deficits to 3% of GDP, which Germany insisted was necessary, were not followed, by the Germans and the French among others, well before the crisis of 2008 and onwards, which has required flexibility. Across the eurozone, the rules to limit vulnerabilities were flouted in normal economic times. Secondly, Greece lied about its numbers to get into the eurozone and continued to lie about its numbers until autumn 2009.

I believe the Greek crisis might still have been solved by a skillful response to the crisis by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. But this did not happen. Nicolos Sarkozy wanted to keep the IMF out, partly because he is worried that Dominique Strauss-Kahn could be his opponent in the next presidential election. Germany wisely insisted on IMF participation. But Angela Merkel’s government has wavered so much on allowing the EU to do its part in rescuing Greece that the uncertainty in the markets has made the necessary rescue package larger than it had to be and less likely to succeed in helping Greece avoid default. As of a few days ago, I am 99% sure Greece will default. Why has Merkel allowed this to happen? Because rescuing the Greeks is enormously unpopular with the German public, and there is an election May 9 in Germany’s biggest region, Nordrhein-Westfalen (which includes Cologne, Dortmund, Essen, Düsseldorf, and a quarter of Germany’s citizens, actually a larger population than that of Greece). If Merkel’s Christian Democrats lose the region to the Social Democrats, they lose control of the upper house of the German parliament, they will have trouble getting their agenda enacted, and early federal elections could result. So Merkel can make an argument that she is acting in the wishes of her countrymen and bowing to political realities. But she is also sacrificing the interests of the entire European Union over the region of Nordrhein-Westfalen. Small-minded priorities are not new in Europe – Greece’s objection to Macedonia’s name is a perfect example – but Merkel is the most powerful woman or man in Europe, she knows it, and she should act accordingly.

The stakes are quite high. Contagion could result in multiple sovereign defaults. If only Greece defaults, the eurozone should be able to survive. If Spain goes down, it’s hard to predict what happens. Reintroducing the old currencies would be tremendously damaging to the peripheral economies. But if Spain defaults, we really would be in a “moment of extraordinary politics,” to use Leszek Balcerowicz’s phrase. What I anticipate is that a two-speed Europe would then become inevitable. A German-led core of the strongest economies, looking much like the original European Community of six nations (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy) plus a few like Austria and/or minus Italy, would have the euro, more fiscal federalism, and perhaps a more unified foreign policy. A ring of European states would be affiliated more loosely, naturally led by Great Britain, but including Greece, much of Eastern Europe and sooner or later possibly Spain, Portugal, and Ireland if they did not manage to or did not want to stay in the core, possibly Turkey (the lower-speed of a two-speed European Union is the only way Turkey would ever gain entry) and perhaps Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. It is hard to work out exactly what the looser group would share with the core Europe or how many of the EU-27 would choose or be forced into it. Perhaps there would be three “concentric circles” rather than two. But a Spanish default would change the European Union significantly.

One thing is certain even if Greece dodges default – Germany and the other members of the eurozone are going to be very wary of letting additional members into the common currency area from now on, although according to the accession treaties Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden are all obligated to join the euro eventually (only Denmark and the United Kingdom are excepted). For Latvia in particular, a country which has suffered an internal devaluation as its leaders have clung to a tight currency peg to the euro and an as-soon-as-possible euro accession strategy like a raft in the storm of a crash which has cut the value of the economy by 20%, changing rules would be extremely cruel. The crisis in the eurozone and the European Union could also delay the EU membership of Croatia, which is already ready already, and countries like Montenegro and Macedonia which for various reasons it would be better to bring in sooner rather than later (while it is tempting to use the crisis to force Greece to abandon its childlike position on Macedonia’s name, this is probably not possible because the country’s leaders are expending so much political capital on austerity measures).

Germany’s inward focus on this crisis only exemplifies what has become a problem for the European project in recent years. Leadership by the big three countries is necessary in enacting changes in the structure and size of the European Union. Britain is perpetually wary of Europe. A referendum on EU membership (actually promised by the pro-European Nick Clegg, who unfortunately doesn’t have a chance of becoming First Lord of the Treasury even if the Liberal Democrats win the most votes May 6, rather than by David Cameron, leader of the Euroskeptic Tories) would likely lead to withdrawal from the Union. Britain has however been a force for widening the union, while fighting against deepening. (This eurozone crisis, by the way, has for the first time convinced me that Britain’s hesitancy to join the euro might not be stupid). The elite of France are quite committed to the European project and deepening the Union and playing an important role in the world, even if the French people themselves are more skeptical. However, France worries that enlargement of the EU dilutes its voice and thus only went along with the 2004 big bang enlargement to the east and strongly opposes Turkish membership. Germany is the most important country in Europe because of its size and economy, and it is the key swing vote between Britain’s widening strategy and France’s deepening; having ambitiously pushed for both widening and deepening in the past, under Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer’s Social Democratic-Green government, it has turned against both under Chancellor Merkel, particularly in her second term with the FDP as her partners instead of the Social Democrats. Only Croatia has a good shot at getting into the EU in the next five years because of its Habsburg history and the fact that Germans like Adriatic beaches. Merkel’s hesitancy to help Greece has only exposed the fact that her pro-European image has been declining since her reelection.

Which brings us back to Greece. Italy is often seen as a joke because of its unfunny clown of a prime minister and its inability to consistently match its economic and demographic weight in Europe with equivalent political weight. But Italy is actually less likely to default than other countries in Europe’s periphery due to high private saving and it actually made some heroic economic adjustments to prepare itself for eurozone membership in the 1990s, even if it has not sufficiently dealt with its large debt (117% of GDP). Greece does a much worse job fitting in with its European partners. Greece has not sufficiently reformed its economy while lying about its numbers. Greece is a beautiful place with a nice culture, but it is not a Western European country and it was and is not prepared for membership in the eurozone. The modern country holds far more the legacy of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. Along with the Greek Cypriots, the Greeks are Russia and Serbia’s best friends within the EU. Greece belongs in a wider conception of Europe that has room for less dynamic economies and Orthodox and Muslim cultures. The behavior and statements of continental Western European statesmen and stateswomen in recent years, from Sarkozy to Merkel to EU President Herman Van Rompuy, has called into question whether that is the Europe that Paris, Berlin and Brussels want. The question of European identity is one that will never be resolved, but the debate is one Europe needs to have. We have a fairly good idea of the dominant British and French viewpoints. The German one is less clear.

Greece gave birth to Europe with Periclean Athens in the 5th Century B.C., seen as a wonderful model by Brits, French and Germans in the 18th and 19th Centuries. It now looks like Greece might well destroy Europe. By the way, does anyone know what image Greece chose to put on their two-euro coin when they dishonestly qualified for the euro back in 2001? The Rape of Europa.