Europe will always be unfinished, because it is an
idea as much as a geographic expression, and a rather idealistic one at that.
The European Union and a few countries which opted
not to join, like Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland, have their problems – structural
economic imbalances in the EU which threaten its sustainability, nationalism on
the rise, democratic regression in countries like Hungary and Romania – but overall
these countries are still among the wealthiest and the freest in the world.
The geographical dilemmas of completing a Europe
“whole, free, and at peace” remain, however. The peninsulas and islands jutting
into the northeastern Atlantic can be pretty sure they’re part of Europe, as
can anyone living anywhere near the Alps. But the seas and straits between
Gibraltar and the Caucasus and the Ural Mountains are a pretty arbitrary
divide. The problem of only partial inclusion in Europe has been particularly
damaging for the more than 260 million citizens of the Russian Federation,
Turkey, and Ukraine.
The EU has its reasons to consolidate its troubled
project rather than continue to expand to new countries. However, Western
Europe has a record of sending contradictory messages to the countries in the continent’s
east. These include extending candidate status to Turkey in 2005, then electing
Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy with their “privileged partnership” and non for Ankara; refusing to confirm the
potential of future membership for Ukraine and Moldova, despite the EU treaties
opening such potential to “any European State” which respects European values;
expanding visa-free travel to all the Christian countries in the Balkans before
any of the Muslim countries; and rhetoric from European Council President Herman
Van Rompuy about European unification’s roots in Middle Ages Latin
Christianity, which dismayed Bulgaria.
With Catholic Croatia now safely in the EU, 23 years
after Germany unilaterally recognized its declaration of independence, and the
four Eastern Christian countries in the bloc (Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and
Romania) in not particularly good standing in the eyes of the older member
states, many EU citizens would be happy to keep these borders. These are the
realities of how a union of 28 disparate democracies handles the prospect of
extending pooled sovereignty to some of more than a dozen countries further
east. These nations are seen as less culturally similar to the older member
states. Some are quite large, some quite small. They are fragile democracies at
best, many fractured, several with breakaway enclaves. All are relatively poor.
But ambivalence in EU capitals and mixed messages sent by Western European leaders
imposes real costs and dilemmas on the democrats of Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other
countries.
Extending the hugely successful European integration
project to the east was always going to be a huge challenge. There are many
reasons to call Europe’s eastern neighborhood policy a great success – the EU
has absorbed 11 former communist countries (12 when you include East Germany),
with over 100 million people. But some clear failings are seen with the three
big countries in Europe’s eastern reaches. Although Russia and Turkey have had
a good 21st century in many respects, with incomes and international
influence steadily rising since the year 2000, it is not surprising that both
of them as well as Ukraine have seen massive protests by pro-democracy /
pro-Western citizens in the last three years, which autocratic leaders
attempted to crush.
Russia, with 142 million people, was always too big
and proud to join the EU. But Russia is clearly a part of modern Europe in many
ways – economically integrated, if mostly as a source of energy sent through
pipelines and oligarch’s cash spent in London and Switzerland, a member of
political groupings such as the Council of Europe and Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, a participant in Eurovision and UEFA soccer
tournaments. However, democracy failed in Russia, damaged by the chaos of the
wild 90s and then smothered in the Putin era by an elite prioritizing its
personal short-term interests and willing to ignore a clear long-term downward
trajectory masked by high energy prices. European companies and many leaders –
above all in Germany and the City of London – tried to look past Russia’s
democratic failings and corruption. But if Berlin’s “Annäherung durch
Verflechtung” (rapprochement through interdependence) worked, “Wandel durch
Handel” (change through trade) failed. Vladimir Putin watched as NATO expanded
to Russia’s borders (as was the right thing to do – the Baltics had very good
cause to want NATO membership), watched the Western intervention in Kosovo
(again, the right thing to do in the face of ethnic cleansing), watched the
U.S. invade Iraq (a grievous mistake in which the U.S. ignored some of Putin’s
better advice), and suffered a major political defeat in Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution. Putin’s anti-Western side was stoked and he transformed from a awkward
partner of the West to an adversary. Russia took actions to destabilize its
neighbors whenever they tried to move closer to the EU and the United States. Those
who claim that the Obama Administration’s “reset” policy was wrongheaded are
unrealistic or ideologues – it was necessary to try to mend ties with Russia
and progress was made on nuclear reductions, Russian membership in the World
Trade Organization, cooperation on Afghanistan, Iran, and Libya. Dmitry
Medvedev was not completely a puppet as president. But in 2011 Putin announced
he had decided to return to the presidency – a historic mistake for Russia –
and responded to subsequent protests with greater repression. At the same time,
Russia backed the Assad regime in Syria to the hilt as its killed tens of
thousands of its citizens and radicalized the opposition. Washington – and importantly
Berlin – have rightly responded with more vocal criticism of Putin and his
regime.
Turkey, with a fast-growing population of 80 million,
is about to surpass Germany on the population table. Many Europeans see it as too
big, too poor, and too Muslim to join the family. Turkish membership would
change the EU, and for EU citizens and leaders who follow the polls, the
negatives of such a change outweighed the positives – greater diversity,
stronger demographics, etc. – which required greater imagination to see. The arguments
of those who saw the benefits were drowned out. Turkey’s candidacy has
effectively been dead for years, buried by the hard opposition of several
member states and ultimately by the subsequent actions of the increasingly
dictatorial Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. For many years, Erdoğan advanced democracy in
Turkey by pursuing European integration and civilian control of the military.
But his uglier side has been unavoidable in the last year, as his response to
the Gezi Park protestors made clear to the world that he had a purely
majoritarian view of democracy and did not respect those of his countrymen who
disagreed with him. Challenged by a corruption scandal, Erdoğan has responded
with purges in the criminal justice system and banning Twitter. He may have
substantial support, as the most recent elections again confirmed, but at this
point he is clearly damaging Turkey’s democracy.
Ukraine, with 44 million people, is where the
autocrats – Putin as well as Viktor Yanukovych – failed. Corruption is even
worse in Ukraine than in Russia or Turkey and the country has been consistently
misgoverned. Persistent Russian interference, often using its energy monopoly
as weapon, has not helped. Critically, the EU has also refused to make clear whether
or not Ukraine could ever become a member, limiting politicians’ appetite for
reform. President Viktor Yushchenko made a mad dash for NATO membership,
despite such a move (and his government) being unpopular within the country,
but at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Germany and France stopped a Bush Administration
push to give Ukraine – and Georgia – a Membership Action Plan. Ukraine’s
diversity gave it a more competitive and indeed chaotic political space than
many of its fellow post-Soviet states, while it remained a fragile economy with
terrible government finances and was walloped by the global economic crisis in
2008. In 2010, Yanukovych, rejected in the Orange Revolution, won a fair
presidential election, then surprised many in the West with the aggressiveness
of his monopolization of the levers of power. He also made moves which pleased
Russia, like unconstitutionally extending the lease on the Black Sea Fleet’s
base by 25 years. But with the EU offering an Association Agreement including a
comprehensive free trade deal, Yanukovych balanced Brussels and Moscow for his
own gain as long as he could. In November 2013, his time ran out, and he chose
Moscow and gave impetus to the EuroMaidan protests. If he hadn’t used violence
against the protests when they were relatively small and imposed draconian
“dictatorship laws” in January 2014, Yanukovych might still be in power.
Instead, he ended up fleeing in February after several bloody days in Kyiv and
an abortive deal brokered by the EU. Ukraine swung west and an incensed Putin
invaded and annexed Crimea. Now Ukraine faces major difficulties in maintaining
control of its territory even without Crimea, given the activities of
secessionists in the east directed and/or inspired by Moscow, while its economy
remains on the brink of collapse, elections must be helped, and difficult
economic reforms must be implemented.
So all three countries are severely troubled. Russia
and Turkey look more autocratic than they have in decades, while Ukraine reached
that point earlier in 2014 and currently remains at acute risk of state
failure. All three are divided countries, their places in today’s Europe –
which for people many means the EU, NATO, or both – are vexed. The reasons for
this are manifold, the products of geography, history, economics, and domestic politics
and foreign policy in dozens of countries. China’s economic performance over
the past three decades has given autocracy a good name, while Putin’s model of
so-called “sovereign democracy” has inspired imitators. The United States,
leader of the free world, allowed its financial system to blow up the world
economy, setting some countries back by a decade, and characteristically did
nothing to deal with the root causes of the problem. Both the U.S. and the EU
are distracted by internal problems, some very serious, and fatigued with
foreign policy and enlargement. But Russia and Turkey heading fast in the wrong
direction and Ukraine in chaos are very dangerous indeed for Europe and its
allies across the Atlantic.
It is in the enlightened self-interest of Europe and
the United States to help Ukraine stabilize and succeed as a less corrupt
democracy in which citizens can meet their aspirations and to incentivize
democratic development and European integration in Russia and Turkey. But
success will require more creativity and generosity than has been in evidence
in recent years.